Civics or Structure? Revisiting the Origins of Democratic Quality in the Italian Regions

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What determines the responsiveness and effectiveness of democratic governments in meeting their citizens’ needs? Based on his 1993 study of the twenty Italian regions, Robert Putnam argued that ‘civic community’, a self-reinforcing syndrome of social engagement and political participation, is the explanation. A re-examination of Putnam’s data reveals little evidence of such a syndrome, but confirms that where more citizens participate in politics outside of networks of clientelistic exchange, more effective democratic government results. To discern the causes of variation in this self-motivated political participation, I test Putnam’s measures of social engagement against aspects of Italian socio-economic structure. Economic development and the historical distribution of land, not social engagement, are found to be powerful predictors of self-motivated political participation and in turn democratic quality.

Governments selected by at least approximately free and fair elections have proliferated around the globe in recent years, leading to a new scholarly emphasis on the quality – rather than merely the existence – of democratic governments. One of the most ambitious studies addressing this issue is Robert Putnam’s book, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.1 Drawing on empirical data collected over a twenty-year period, Putnam mapped the performance of the elected governments of Italy’s twenty regions in a laundry list of policy areas ranging from the timeliness of the regional budget to the provision of day care. He found remarkable consistency among these measures: some regional governments were simply more effective and responsive in meeting their citizens’ needs than others were. These differences, he ultimately concluded, were the result of centuries-old variations in ‘civic community’, a self-reinforcing syndrome of political participation and engagement in social networks.

This article begins with a review and reanalysis of Putnam’s data to determine whether civic community actually exists in the Italian regions. The exercise reveals that the apparent intercorrelations among political and social activity across regions, which justified Putnam’s characterization of them as aspects of a single syndrome, are in fact artefacts of the vast differences between Italy’s north and south. I then examine variations in the rates of self-motivated political participation across the Italian regions. I show that differences in government performance found in Italy can be explained by these differences in

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self-motivated political participation and not by a Toquevillian effect of joining recreational associations or reading newspapers. The final part of the article seeks to account for the differences observed in rates of self-motivated political participation and so, indirectly, in the quality of the regions’ democratic governments. It tests Putnam’s hypotheses about the positive effects of social engagement against the effects of socio-economic structure as measured by economic development and by historical patterns of landholding.

RETESTING THE CIVIC COMMUNITY HYPOTHESIS

In *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam contended that the variation in the effectiveness of Italy’s regional governments was the result of differing levels of what he termed ‘civic community’. Inspired by de Tocqueville, he argued that, where present, civic community is manifested in a profusion of recreational and cultural associations, high rates of newspaper readership, voting in national elections based on the ideological stances of parties rather than the personalistic appeals of individual candidates, and high turnout for political referendums. The differences in civic community exhibited in the regions of contemporary Italy, further, can be traced to patterns of behaviour established in early medieval times, at least as early as AD 1100. The conventional argument linking democratic performance to socio-economic factors is based on a spurious relationship, according to Putnam: both politics and economics are driven by civics.

One of the first aspects of the argument to come under criticism was its historical component. Putnam’s account compressed eight centuries of Italian history into nineteen pages; its sweeping generalizations on rich traditions of co-operation in the north and mistrust in the south were virtually assured to be superficial. Not only, however, was his reading of history deemed highly selective, it was condemned as wildly inaccurate in the light of the well-documented examples of collaboration and mutual assistance, such as sheep-grazing associations, that persisted during much of this time period in some southern regions.²

That the patterns of civic culture Putnam found in post-war Italy did not exist prior to the twentieth century, of course, does not directly disprove their contemporary existence. Putnam’s contention that the political and social elements of civic community actually form a coherent syndrome, however, does not withstand closer examination. As Ellis Goldberg noted, the wide divergence between northern and southern Italy tends to spuriously inflate correlations when all twenty Italian regions are considered. The true test of whether proposed relationships actually exist, therefore, must consider those relationships both ‘within the north and within the south’.³ Indeed, it was on this basis that

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Putnam rejected any simple explanation of government performance based on levels of economic development.4

When the regions of northern and central Italy and those of southern Italy are considered separately,5 the high intercorrelations between the elements of the civic community index that justified considering them to be aspects of an underlying ‘civicness’ disintegrate. The first column of Table 1 reproduces Putnam’s principal-components factor analysis of his indicators of the civic community index across all regions.6 The second and third columns present similar analyses using Putnam’s data for the northern regions and for the southern regions separately.7

Across northern Italy, the two indicators of political participation, preference voting and referendum turnout, display the expected close relationship. However, the indicators of Toquevillian social participation, newspaper readership and the scarcity of recreational associations, actually display signs opposite to those hypothesized: more social participation is found in regions with less political participation across the north. The civic community index does fare somewhat better in the south, where all of the loadings are at least in the expected directions, but even there the relationships are less impressive than when all twenty regions are considered, and only the indicators of political participation are statistically significant. Putnam’s civic-community hypothesis, in short, fails his own test.8

5 Following Putnam, the northern and central Italian regions are defined as Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia-Giulia, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche and Lazio. The southern regions are Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna (Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, p. 85). Some other authors have considered Lazio, the region around Rome, to be part of the South, but this choice does not qualitatively affect the analyses presented below.
6 I am grateful to Robert Putnam for generously sharing his original dataset on the Italian regions with me. Putnam constructed his indicators as follows: ‘Preference Voting’ is a principal-components factor index of the percentage of voters casting a preference vote, that is, specifying the particular candidate in addition to the party list of their choice, in six national elections held from 1953 to 1979; all loadings on this index are 0.97 and higher. ‘Referendum Turnout’ is a principal-components factor index of the percentage of voters participating in five national referendums held from 1974 to 1987; all loadings exceed 0.98 for this index. ‘Newspaper Readership’ is measured as the percentage of households that received a daily newspaper in 1975. Putnam defined ‘Scarcity of sports and cultural associations’ as the number of residents per sports or cultural association in 1981 (Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, pp. 91–6).
7 All statistical analyses for this article were conducted using Intercooled Stata 7.0.

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**Table 1**  Testing Putnam’s Civic Community Hypothesis in Northern and Southern Italy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>All regions (n = 20)</th>
<th>Northern Italy (n = 12)</th>
<th>Southern Italy (n = 8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preference Voting, 1953–79</td>
<td>-0.95***</td>
<td>-0.79***</td>
<td>-0.72*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum Turnout, 1974–87</td>
<td>0.94***</td>
<td>0.92***</td>
<td>0.84**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Readership, 1975</td>
<td>0.89***</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarcity of sports and cultural associations, 1981</td>
<td>-0.89***</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, one-tailed tests.

Note: Results contrary to hypothesis are italicized. Principal-components factor loadings.
found when all Italian regions are considered are not the result of measuring various aspects of a single underlying concept of civicness, then, but only the vast differences between northern and southern Italy.

EXPLAINING EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ITALY: THE ROLE OF SELF-MOTIVATED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

As Putnam’s hypothesized civic community does not in fact form a coherent syndrome across the Italian regions, it cannot serve as an explanation for the wide variation he observed in the performance of the regional governments. I hypothesize that it is the rate of self-motivated political participation – and not the Toquevillian effects of joining associations or reading newspapers – that explains these differences in democratic quality.

In democracies, elections are the principal means by which citizens may hold government officials accountable for their performance. Where more citizens participate in politics outside of patron–client networks, therefore, governments should be expected to be more responsive to their citizens’ needs. As Arend Lijphart underscored in his 1996 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, there is an expansive literature establishing that higher turnouts are more representative of the entire public. When turnouts are lower, ‘the inequality of representation and influence are not randomly distributed but systematically biased in favour of more privileged citizens – those with higher incomes, greater wealth, and better education – and against less advantaged citizens’. Because ‘democratic responsiveness of elected officials depends on citizen participation’, lower rates of self-motivated political participation yield lower-quality democracies.9

Participation induced by patronage, however, defeats the electoral mechanism: votes cast in exchange for particularistic benefits reflect the preferences of the patron rather than those of the voter. Referendum turnout is therefore actually a better indicator of ‘representation and influence’ than electoral turnout in Italy, because, as Putnam explains, many of those going to the polls in general elections do so in ‘a straightforward quid pro quo for immediate, personal patronage benefits’.10 Further, voting in referendums, unlike electoral voting until the reforms of the 1990s, was not compulsory in Italy. Participation in national referendums, because it excludes the effects of patron–client networks and compulsory voting laws, more accurately measures self-motivated political participation and so the degree to which a region’s inhabitants demand government representative of and responsive to their interests.11 Putnam also notes that use of the preference vote, in which a voter specifies a particular candidate rather than simply the party list of his or her choice, is ‘essential to the patron–client exchange relationship’ in many parts of Italy.

10 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 93.
11 As Robert Jackman and Ross Miller noted, turnout in referendums has steadily declined since the 1970s as referendums have become more frequent and the number of issues to be decided increased, consistent with the voter fatigue hypothesis (Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, ‘A Renaissance of Political Culture?’ American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 632–59, p. 642 n.11). Indeed, several recent referendums have been rejected for failing to meet minimum turnout requirements. Of course, it is not the absolute levels of political participation, but rather the relative levels of participation across regions, that are important in an explanation of relative government performance.
Higher levels of preference voting therefore indicate that political participation is less self-motivated and more driven by clientelistic exchange.\textsuperscript{12}

The analyses presented in Table 1 show that referendum turnout and preference voting are closely interrelated in the regions of northern and central Italy as well as in those of the south: where more citizens vote in referendums, fewer cast preference votes in elections. On this basis, I have created a principal-components factor index of self-motivated political participation that weights these two measures equally across all regions. Table 2 confirms that this index is indeed highly correlated with referendum turnout and preference voting both in the north and in the south.

To test whether self-motivated political participation provides a better explanation for differences in regional-government responsiveness than any Tocquevillian effects of joining associations or reading newspapers, I use Putnam’s index of government

\textbf{TABLE 2}  \hspace{1cm} \textit{Bivariate Correlations Between Self-Motivated Political Participation, Turnout in Referendums and Preference Voting in Northern and Southern Italy}

\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & Self-motivated political participation & \\
 & All regions  & Northern Italy  & Southern Italy  \\
 & (n = 20) & (n = 12) & (n = 8) \\
\hline
Referendum turnout & 0.98*** & 0.88*** & 0.76* \\
Preference voting & -0.98*** & -0.93*** & -0.80** \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Bivariate Correlations Between Self-Motivated Political Participation, Turnout in Referendums and Preference Voting in Northern and Southern Italy}
\end{table}

\*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001, one-tailed tests.

\textbf{TABLE 3}  \hspace{1cm} \textit{Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis of Regional Government Performance}

\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & Self-motivated political participation & \\
 & All regions  & Northern Italy  & Southern Italy  \\
 & (n = 20) & (n = 12) & (n = 8) \\
\hline
Self-motivated political participation & 0.84*** & 0.82* & 1.16* \\
 & (0.17) & (0.40) & (0.35) \\
Newspaper readership & -0.01 & 0.01 & -0.02 \\
 & (0.01) & (0.03) & (0.01) \\
Scarcity of sports and cultural associations & -0.26* & -0.22 & -0.32 \\
 & (0.14) & (0.41) & (0.16) \\
R\textsuperscript{2} & 0.88 & 0.35 & 0.81 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis of Regional Government Performance}
\end{table}

\*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001, one-tailed tests.

\textit{Notes}: Results contrary to hypothesis are italicized. Unstandardized coefficients are reported on the first line in each row; the second line reports the associated standard errors in parentheses.

\textsuperscript{12} Putnam, \textit{Making Democracy Work}, p. 94.
performance as a dependent variable in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis.  

The first column of Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis when all twenty Italian regions are considered. The effect of self-motivated political participation on the performance of democratic governments is strong and highly statistically significant. Newspaper readership is found to have a negative effect on government performance, contrary to hypothesis, although this relationship is not statistically significant. When all Italian regions are considered, the scarcity of recreational associations does exhibit the expected negative relationship to the responsiveness of regional government, and this coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. This effect, however, cannot be distinguished from zero when the northern and southern regions are examined separately, as the second and third columns of the table reveal. The effect of self-motivated political participation, by contrast, remains strong and statistically significant in both halves of the peninsula. 

This analysis demonstrates that differences in the quality of democratic government across the Italian regions are not the direct result of a culture of social engagement as evidenced by joining recreational associations or reading newspapers, but of the extent to which citizens, through self-motivated political participation, hold government officials accountable for their performance.

EXPLAINING SELF-MOTIVATED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: HYPOTHESES AND DATA

Effective democratic government in Italy does not appear to be directly related to a syndrome of factors that Putnam called civic community, but rather is well predicted only by rates of self-motivated political participation. Therefore, the remainder of this article focuses on the factors that potentially influence rates of such participation and so indirectly affect democratic quality. Drawing on the literature on democratic participation as well as comparative historical works explaining the origins of democracy, I hypothesize that self-motivated political participation depends not on social engagement evidenced by newspaper readership and networks of recreational associations, but on levels of economic development and historical patterns of landholding. These hypotheses are set forth below.

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13 As newspaper readership and the scarcity of sports and cultural associations are not closely correlated in the north (r = 0.06) or the south (r = −0.13), Putnam’s two measures of social engagement cannot be meaningfully combined into a single index.

14 Multicolinearity does not impact any of the results presented in Table 3. The highest variance-inflation factor is that for self-motivated political participation when all regions are considered, 3.4; multicolinearity is typically considered problematic when the variance inflation factor reaches 4.0, the point at which standard errors are doubled. The reported results, further, are robust to the introduction of controls for the structural variables discussed in the next section.

15 In the interests of space and clarity, several additional factors suggested in the literature are not presented in the analysis below. Although André Blais and Agnieszka Dobrsynska, in their article, ‘Turnout in Electoral Democracies’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 33 (1998), 239–61, found some support for demographic factors as predictors of electoral turnout cross-nationally, population size and density do not have statistically significant relationships with self-motivated political participation in Italy when controlled by the other factors considered, and their inclusion does not substantially change the results reported. Margaret Kohn has argued that the explanation for variation in the Italian regions lies in neither civic community nor directly in socio-economic structure, but in the role of the red subculture anchored in the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) in mobilizing and integrating subaltern classes into political life (Kohn, ‘Civic Republicanism Versus Social Struggle: A Gramscian Approach to Associationalism in Italy’, *Political Power and Social Theory*, 13 (1999), 201–35). The strength of the PCI, however, does not have an independent impact on rates of self-motivated political
Social Engagement

Although Putnam’s measures of social engagement, associationalism and newspaper readership, do not demonstrate direct relationships with effective democratic government, these measures may have indirect effects through their relationship with self-motivated political participation. Putnam, in fact, justified combining associational density and levels of newspaper readership with referendum turnout into a single index of civic community on these Tocquevillian grounds. He argued that associations teach the skills and habits of co-operation and shared responsibility and therefore ‘members of associations displayed more political sophistication, social trust, political participation, and “subjective civic competence”’. Similarly, he reasoned that ‘[n]ewspaper readers are better informed than nonreaders and thus better equipped to participate in civic deliberations’ and ‘newspaper readership is a mark of citizen interest in community affairs’. To evaluate these hypotheses, I again use Putnam’s data on the scarcity of recreational associations and rates of newspaper readership across the regions.

Economic Development

A common hypothesis is that economic development increases political participation. Development expands education and increases incomes, thereby providing more people with the resources needed to participate in politics. Both cross-national research using aggregate data and studies conducted at the individual level have supported this hypothesis, demonstrating that education and income are highly significant and robust predictors of electoral turnout.

Education is here operationalized as the percentage of the regional population over the age of 6 that had at least an elementary education according to the 1981 Italian national census. For regional gross domestic product (GDP) per inhabitant, I use European Community figures for 1977 through 1986 as reported by Robert Leonardi.

(participation when included in the analysis presented. It has also recently been argued that the northern regions’ greater ‘proximity to the epicenter of liberalism on the European continent in the 18th and 19th centuries, France’, accounts for the differences between north and south in Italy; see Stephen Hanson and Jeffrey Kopstein, ‘Regime Type, Diffusion, and Democracy: A Methodological Critique of Designing Social Inquiry in Comparative Politics’ (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2000). This argument lacks even face validity, as the most effective governments and highest rates of self-motivated political participation are not found in the regions closest to France, but in the central regions of Emilia-Romagna, Toscana and Umbria. Valle d’Aosta, which borders France, actually scores lowest among the northern and central regions on these variables. Institutional effects on democratic quality and political participation have garnered increased attention recently, but because the Italian regions share a common legal-institutional structure, variation across them cannot be attributed to different political institutions or voting laws.

Putnam, Making Democracy Work, pp. 90, 92. At least one recent study has purported to provide some support for the civic-engagement hypothesis. Amber Seligson, on the basis of survey data collected in the six Spanish-speaking countries of Central America, concluded that participation in certain neighbourhood associations increases democratic political participation, although participation in recreational associations does not (Amber L. Seligson, ‘Civic Association and Democratic Participation in Central America: A Test of the Putnam Thesis’, Comparative Political Studies, 32 (1999), 342–61).


regions, these two indicators of socio-economic development are highly correlated with each other ($r = 0.90$), making combining them into a single principal-components index of development (‘Dev’) appropriate; the loading for each on this index is 0.93.\(^{20}\)

A crucial element of Putnam’s argument in *Making Democracy Work* is that differences in socio-economic development across the Italian regions are the product rather than the cause of variations in participation in politics and social associations. ‘[T]he powerful contemporary correlation between economics and civics did not exist a century ago,’ he claimed, but, ‘[l]ike a powerful magnetic field, civic conditions seem gradually but inexorably to have brought socioeconomic conditions into alignment.’\(^{21}\) The possibility that differences in self-motivated political participation are the cause of variation in economic development is, however, slight in the Italian case.

A simple analysis similar to the ‘statistical horse race’ Putnam presented can be used as a further test for endogeneity. In the language of time-series statistics, this is known as a test of Granger causality. If economic development does cause self-motivated political participation, earlier levels of development should predict later political participation even when controlling for early rates of participation – in a sense, changes in participation rates over time will be linked to earlier differences in development. But if political participation generates economic development, early rates of participation will predict later development even when controlling for earlier development. If both of these hypotheses prove true, the relationship between economic development and self-motivated political participation is reciprocal: each affects the other.

When self-motivated political participation is predicted using rates of political participation and levels of development from the early decades of the twentieth century, early development is a statistically significant predictor (beta = 0.67, $p = 0.01$), but early political participation is not (beta = 0.20, $p = 0.22$).\(^{22}\) Conversely, contemporary economic development is extremely well predicted by early levels of development (beta = 0.92, $p < 0.001$), but not by early rates of political participation (beta = 0.08, $p = 0.20$). If there is a causal arrow between levels of development and rates of self-motivated political participation, this analysis lends support to Putnam’s argument.

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\(^{20}\) Both education and gross domestic product per capita remain strongly and significantly correlated with the index of development within the northern regions as well as within the southern regions; all of these correlations are greater than 0.85.

\(^{21}\) Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*: p. 153. Putnam’s analysis, however, was flawed by bad data. As Italian economic historian Vera Zamagni established even before the publication of *Making Democracy Work*, the pre-First World War Italian national population censuses on which Putnam’s analysis relied greatly overstated the industrial workforce of the southern regions because the censuses ‘considered female domestic production of textiles for the family a form of “industrial” occupation’, a phenomenon much more common in the south (Vera Zamagni, ‘A Century of Change: Trends in the Composition of the Italian Labor Force, 1881–1981’, *Historical Social Research*, 44 (1987), 36–97, p. 37). Using data from concurrent national industrial censuses, she was able to correct these inaccuracies. When the corrected figures are used, the correlation between industrial employment in 1911 and turnout in the first elections under universal manhood suffrage a decade later ($r = 0.57$) is almost exactly identical to that between 1961 industrial employment and referendum turnout in the 1970s ($r = 0.54$). This stable relationship between industrial employment and political participation can hardly be seen as evidence that economic development has been magnetically ‘brought into alignment’.

\(^{22}\) Because of data limitations, the sample for this analysis, like that of Putnam’s original ‘horse race’, omits Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto and Friuli Venezia-Giulia and treats Abruzzi and Molise as a single region, yielding an $n$ of 16. Early political participation is operationalized as turnout in the national and local elections held between 1919 and 1921, the only elections conducted under universal manhood suffrage during Italy’s first, brief experience with democracy. Levels of early economic development are measured using literacy rates from 1911 and 1936, as complete data on GDP per capita across regions for the early decades of the twentieth century are unavailable. Reported significance levels, given the directional hypotheses, are based on one-tailed tests.
participation, this analysis demonstrates that it almost certainly runs only from the former to the latter.

**Agrarian Legacies**

One condition that so far has been overlooked by the quantitative literature on political participation is the historical structure of the agricultural sector.\(^{23}\) Putnam, in a footnote, discounts agrarian legacies ‘because traditional landholding patterns in Italy vary in complex ways that are at best imperfectly correlated’ with the variations in political behaviour he observed.\(^{24}\)

There are, however, sound theoretical and empirical reasons for supposing that the distribution of land affects political participation. Patterns of landholding typified by medium-sized family farms tend to disperse economic resources more evenly, making the concentration of political power more difficult; patterns of large estates and small peasantry (*latifondi* and *minifondi*), however, tend to concentrate economic and political power in the hands of relatively small groups of landed elites who frequently oppose participatory and competitive politics.\(^{25}\) Even after competitive politics are established, the relative concentration of power found when family farms are weak not only makes self-motivated political participation appear futile to those on the lower rungs of society, but also facilitates both its outright repression and its co-optation through patron–client networks.\(^{26}\)

Qualitative evidence of Italy’s pre-war experience appears to support this hypothesized relationship between landholding patterns and contemporary political participation. Margaret Kohn argued that the tiny peasant plots that, in numerical terms, constituted the vast majority of landholdings in southern regions inhibited independent political participation, and when peasants did form autonomous political organizations at the turn of the century, the southern *‘latifondisti’* supported military style repression to crush them.\(^{27}\) Sydel Silverman concluded that the highly fragmented peasant holdings in the south (in contrast to the family farms typical of central Italy) prevented the formation of stable political alliances within the lower class and, by denying most agricultural families even minimal self-sufficiency, made individual patron–client relationships of greater importance than in the north.\(^{28}\) Filippo Sabetti noted that large landholders dominated the countryside in the south in the years after the 1860 unification of Italy and locked most

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\(^{23}\) A partial, if crude and largely under-theorized, exception may be the traditional use of a dummy variable or a separate regression for the US south in work on turnout in the United States. See, e.g., Leighley and Nagler, ‘Individual and Systematic Influences on Turnout’; Samuel C. Patterson and Gregory A. Caldeira, ‘Getting out the Vote: Participation in Gubernatorial Elections,’ *American Political Science Review*, 77 (1983), 675–89.


\(^{27}\) Kohn, ‘Civic Republicanism Versus Social Struggle’, p. 226.

ordinary people into an ‘iron circle’: they had no legal means of defending themselves from the landlords’ oppression because the law favoured the landlords, and no illegal remedies would be tolerated by the new national government.29

Landholding patterns have not remained unchanged, however, since the post-war re-establishment of democracy in Italy. Over the 1950s and 1960s, land reform gradually did away with the south’s large landholdings, although, as Silverman observed, ‘land reform has meant a redistribution of large estates in dispersed fragments to peasants of the area; this has increased the land in peasant proprietorship, but it has not significantly altered agricultural organization’ – medium-sized, family farms remain rare in the south.30

In any event, the hypothesis presented here is not that contemporary landholding patterns help explain differences in political participation: in the post-war era, Italy has become one of the world’s most advanced industrial societies, and it would be surprising indeed if the current distribution of agricultural land powerfully shaped political life. The legacies of the distribution of land just before democratization, however, plausibly may play such an important role through two complementary mechanisms. First, patterns in self-motivated political participation and patronage-driven politics established in the early years of Italy’s democracy and originating in differences in contemporary landholding became institutionalized in autonomous political organizations and patron–client networks. These institutions then outlived the social structures that created them and maintained differences in self-motivated political participation decades after their creation. Secondly, as Dahl has suggested, initial distributions of land continue to shape the distributions of income, wealth and other economic resources as economic activity shifts from agriculture to industry.31

The relative concentration of economic resources in regions typified by large estates and small peasantry rather than family farms is reproduced in other forms of economic inequality even when the distribution of land subsequently changes, and so continues to facilitate the concentration of political power.32

There is some empirical evidence that historical landholding patterns had the hypothesized effects on both institutional development and the later distribution of economic resources in Italy’s regions. Kohn has argued that the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) served as the most important autonomous political organization in post-war Italy.33 Although PCI membership was uniformly low throughout the southern regions (and so cannot be explained by varying landholding patterns), across the northern regions, PCI membership is highly correlated with the pre-war strength of family farms ($r = 0.799$, $p < 0.001$).34 Data on the current distribution of economic

31 Dahl, Polyarchy, pp. 82–6.
32 The two mechanisms are likely to reinforce each other. Institutionalized patterns of political participation rooted in earlier landholding patterns bolster the reproduction of the distribution of economic resources – autonomous political organizations provide the means of checking a new concentration of wealth, while notables use their patron–client networks to ensure that redistributive policies do not reach the political agenda. The reproduction of patterns of economic inequality similarly reinforces associated institutions: continued relative equality makes certain that existing autonomous political organizations are not choked off, and the maintenance of a highly skewed distribution of economic resources allows patron–client networks to retain their importance.
33 Kohn, ‘Civic Republicanism Versus Social Struggle’.
34 The PCI membership data used here is taken from Kohn, ‘Civic Republicanism Versus Social Struggle’, and is for the years 1981 to 1984. The operationalization of the strength of family farms is described in the next paragraph.
resources in every Italian region is not available, but a survey of the incomes of over 8,000 Italian households conducted by the Bank of Italy in 1995 and archived by the Luxembourg Income Study allowed me to measure income inequality in eighteen of the twenty regions.\(^{35}\) According to these data, income inequality, calculated as the ratio of the income of the top 10 per cent of households to that of the bottom 50 per cent of households, is strongly negatively correlated with the pre-war strength of family farms across all regions \((r = -0.69, p < 0.001)\), in the north \((r = -0.75, p < 0.01)\), and in the south \((r = -0.74, p = 0.03)\).\(^{36}\)

I therefore hypothesize that the greater the historical importance of family farms, the higher levels of self-motivated political participation in the region will be. To test this hypothesis, I use data on landholding patterns found in the comprehensive survey of land ownership at the regional and provincial levels conducted in 1930 as part of Italy’s first general census of agriculture.\(^{37}\) Following contemporary analysis of the 1930 agricultural census, I operationalize the strength of family farms as the percentage of agricultural land held in farms of more than ten hectares but less than one hundred hectares.\(^{38}\) The amount of land historically held in family farms varies from 14.5 per cent in Valle d’Aosta and 16.2 per cent in Abruzzi to 56.2 per cent in Umbria and 58.9 per cent in Emilia-Romagna.\(^{39}\)

Although one might reasonably suspect that the fertility of a region’s agricultural land determines the size of farms, this does not appear to be the case across the Italian regions. Using data on total agricultural output and total land used in agriculture collected in 1937,\(^{40}\) I calculated average agricultural productivity for each region. The correlation between agricultural productivity and the percentage of agricultural land held in medium-sized, family farms in 1930 is essentially zero \((r = -0.03, p = 0.90)\).

\(^{35}\) Valle d’Aosta was excluded by the survey, and fewer than a hundred households were surveyed in Molise, rendering the resulting distribution unreliable. Further information on the survey and the Luxembourg Income Study is available on the internet at http://www.lisproject.org.

\(^{36}\) According to this data, income inequality was lowest in Umbria (1.59) and Toscana (1.76) and highest in Campania (2.46) and Calabria (2.35). The ratio of incomes of the top 10 per cent of households to the bottom 10 per cent and that for the top 20 per cent to the bottom 20 per cent display nearly identical patterns.

\(^{37}\) Istituto Centrale di Statistica del Regno D’Italia, *Censimento Generale Dell’agricoltura, 19 Marzo 1930*, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico Dello Stato, 1935). In addition to regional data, the survey also provides provincial (sub-regional) level data that allowed me to calculate the percentage of land in family farms in Abruzzi and Molise (they are reported jointly in early regional-level statistics), for Valle d’Aosta and Piemonte (Valle d’Aosta was part of Piemonte until after the Second World War), and for Friuli Venezia-Guilia (much of the region’s area during the interwar years eventually became part of Yugoslavia and now Slovenia).

\(^{38}\) Alfredo De Polzer, *Statistiche Agrarie*, ed. Corrado Gini, *Trattato Elementare Di Statistica* (Milan: Istituto Centrale di Statistica del Regno D’Italia, 1942), p. 124. Operationalizations with different ranges – those varying the lower limit from 10 to 3 or 5 or 20 hectares or the upper limit from 100 to 50 hectares – although not included here, yield substantially similar results.

\(^{39}\) Interestingly, the 1930 census does not support the revisionist view, based largely on the incomplete agricultural census of 1947, Istituto Nazionale di Economia Agraria, *La Distribuzione Della Proprietà Fondiaria in Italia*, vol. 2 (Rome: Edizioni Italiane, 1948), that latifondi were rare and unimportant in southern Italy by the start of the twentieth century: approximately half of all agricultural lands in Basilicata, Calabria and Sardegna were held in estates greater than 100 hectares in 1930, although these estates of course composed a relatively small fraction of the total number of farms.

EXPLAINING SELF-MOTIVATED PARTICIPATION: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The hypothesis that self-motivated political participation – and, therefore, the responsiveness and effectiveness of elected governments – depends on levels of economic development and patterns of land distribution rather than social engagement is strongly supported. Economic development and the historical strength of family farms both display strong and highly statistically significant effects on self-motivated political participation across all regions as well as when the north and south are considered independently (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
<th>Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis of Self-Motivated Political Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-motivated political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All regions (n = 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper readership</td>
<td>$-0.01$ (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarcity of sports and cultural associations</td>
<td>$-0.03$ (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical strength of family farms</td>
<td>$0.04^{***}$ (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>$0.89^{***}$ (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, one-tailed tests.
Notes: Results contrary to hypothesis are italicized. Unstandardized coefficients are reported on the first line in each row; the second line reports the associated standard errors in parentheses.

Putnam’s measures of social engagement display little relationship to rates of self-motivated political participation. The effect of higher rates of newspaper readership on political participation is consistently negative, contrary to hypothesis, and cannot be distinguished from zero. The scarcity of recreational associations exhibits the hypothesized negative effect only when all regions or the south are considered; the effect turns positive across northern Italy. It fails to reach statistical significance in any of the three analyses.

CONCLUSIONS

Variation in the quality of democratic government in Italy’s regions is not a function of Robert Putnam’s hypothesized civic community, but rather results directly from differences in self-motivated political participation and indirectly from patterns of socio-economic structure. A closer examination of Putnam’s data reveals that civic community does not exist as a coherent syndrome of social engagement and political participation in the Italian regions. Although the elements of civic community appear well related across all of the regions, these correlations disappear when examined within the north and within the south, the test Putnam himself used to evaluate and reject rival hypotheses.
Self-motivated political participation, independently of Putnam’s measures of Toquevillian social engagement, explains the differences in the regional governments’ performance. Democratic elections provide a mechanism for holding public officials accountable, but their efficacy depends upon broad participation: lower rates of participation yield a skewed picture of citizen preferences. Similarly, patronage politics circumvent the electoral mechanism, because votes then indicate the preferences of the patron rather than the voter. When more citizens participate in politics and participate on their own terms, not as part of a clientelistic exchange for an individual benefit, elections better serve to hold public officials accountable for their performance, and so governments are more responsive and effective in meeting citizen needs.

Self-motivated political participation does not appear closely linked to patterns of social engagement built up across Italy by associations, newspapers and common endeavours over the last ten centuries. Instead, my analysis demonstrates that its strongest and most consistent predictors are socio-economic variables. First, consistent with the findings of a broad literature on electoral turnout at both the individual and aggregate levels, higher levels of economic development generate higher levels of political participation across the Italian regions. For a given profile of the distribution of economic resources, greater economic development means that more people have the education and income needed to participate effectively and on their own terms in politics.

Secondly, historical patterns of landholding also display a powerful effect on self-motivated political participation in my analyses. Where more land was held in family farms rather than great estates and tiny peasant plots when democracy was established, the relative dispersion of economic resources facilitated the strengthening of autonomous political organizations such as the PCI and discouraged the formation of patron–client networks; once in place, these institutions continued working to mobilize (or demobilize) self-motivated political participation decades later. Further, the historical distribution of land affected the distribution of other economic resources even after agriculture’s importance to Italy’s economy declined: the stronger a region’s family farms were historically, the less concentrated the region’s economic resources are today. As during Italy’s first experience with democracy in the early decades of the twentieth century, more dispersed economic resources act to make attempts to concentrate political power more difficult and so both permit and encourage broad political participation outside of clientelistic relationships.

The economic resources of a region’s citizens are the resources that may be used to influence others or to resist others’ influence: economic resources are therefore political resources. The analyses presented in this article demonstrate that the quality of democracy in Italy’s regions does not depend on bird-watching groups or soccer clubs, but ultimately on the amount and distribution of these resources. Where economic resources are more plentiful and more evenly distributed, more citizens participate in politics on their own terms. Higher rates of self-motivated political participation in turn make elections better mechanisms for holding government officials accountable, and higher-quality democracy results.